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Is some perceptual content nonconceptual — in the sense that a person need
not possess “matching concepts” for “the general features entering into those
contents”? (Tye, 1995, p. 139) This certainly looks like a question. But
what it asks is not genuinely in question if we keep in place the background
commitments that make positing nonconceptual content not only sensible
but also inevitable. This question – Is some perceptual content nonconcep-
tual, provided we keep in place the commitments that make positing such
content sensible and needed? – quite evidently needs no discussion since its
answer can only be yes. The question can be refocused slightly while deliv-
ering an equally inevitable verdict. Is all perceptual content conceptual (so
that there is no nonconceptual content), provided we keep in place the back-
ground commitments that make positing nonconceptual content sensible and
inevitable? Like its equivalent, this question can only have one answer – in
this case, no – needing no discussion either.
Why make such an apparently obvious point? Because the trend is to
zero-in on the details of various competing proposals without addressing the
background commitments that will make those details seem sensible or just
                                                
1 I would like to thank my editor, Christine van Geen for her most helpful comments and
suggestions. As always, I would also like to thank William Seager for his insightful criticisms
and wonderful conversation. This paper has a companion, or better yet, sister paper with
which, like a Siamese twin, it is joined at the hip. The two papers present a package, joined in
what I present here briefly in Part I, and developed in detail in “Perceptual Engagement with
the World, starting afresh with disjunctivism.”
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the opposite. This trend seems to prevail among a heterogeneous variety of
proposals in favor of factoring perceptual experience into conceptual and
nonconceptual contents. Rather than focusing on the details of competing
proposals for and against nonconceptual contents, we need to pause to exam-
ine the commitments on both sides. Why not explore alternatives to the
predominant status quo, alternatives that urge thorough transformations in
our understanding of ourselves, transformations that displace certain seem-
ingly inevitable issues and solutions?
Here is a question that we might ask in place of the earlier apparent
questions, once we change our focus from details to background commit-
ments.
Would there be any reason to posit nonconceptual content if the world
that persons experience is not a brute presence but a range of think-
ables, so that it is a genuine possibility that the world and our experi-
ences, and the world and our thoughts interpenetrate?
In such a transformation of our understanding of ‘our place in the physical
universe’ – as we tend to say when we acculturate undergraduates to the is-
sues in contemporary theory of mind – the need to posit nonconceptual con-
tent does not arise because perceptual content can be explained without con-
troversy as just what it seems to be: experiential content that engages or
involves individuals and their determinate properties in the world. As things
stand today, a range of revisionary work spanning across metaphysics, phi-
losophy of language, philosophy of mind and theory of knowledge is needed
to make this sort of view available: that the richness and fine grain of per-
ceptual content is the richness and fine grain of determinate properties in the
world under perceptual modes of presentation. That is why the issue is noth-
ing less than constitutive. Should we change our philosophical understand-
ing of ourselves in transformative ways – transformations that imply that
personal content is and can only be thoroughly conceptual?
I will be arguing that the answer to this question is ‘yes.’ (i) Perceptual
content involves individuals in their perceptible determinate properties. (ii)
Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on
our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. Experience that
involves determinate properties is not pre- or non-conceptual.
This is the conceptualist proposal. I divide the proposal into two princi-
pal components to indicate points of divergence with theorists who propose
that the rich, fine grain of our perceptual experiences is a nonconceptual
content. The first key point of divergence is whether the fine grain of per-
ceptual experience is to be understood internally or contextually. Some but
not all proposals for nonconceptual contents are internalist, casting noncon-
ceptual contents as determined by (or supervenient on) facts about the indi-
NONCONCEPTUAL EPICYCLES / 33
vidual perceiver. However, some nonconceptualists and conceptualists share
the belief that the qualitative character of perceptual experience needs an ex-
ternalist explanation that includes broader contextual factors. Yet this shared
understanding immediately divides over the question whether our conceptual
capacities are an integral element in our perceptual capacity to engage with
properties in the world.
Perhaps it is too strong to suggest that what is at issue is a paradigm
shift as my title suggests. What seems undeniable is that there is ‘business
as usual’ in theory of mind – recognizably normal ways of posing issues
and setting about addressing them – with fringes of suggestions that do not
quite mesh here and there. One such recalcitrant nub coalesces around the
view that all personal content is conceptual since this implication seems to
disturb ‘business as usual’ into a defensive posture, defensive in the well-
understood sense that ‘the best defense is offense.’ But at least the sugges-
tion of something approaching a paradigm shift might be provocative
enough to re-channel the debate somewhat. To place the issues genuinely
under scrutiny, debate needs to address the commitments that hold the need
for something like nonconceptual content in place and alternative commit-
ments that displace that need.
At least this is my view. I cannot speak for McDowell and Brewer – the
culprits usually identified as making various mistakes in their arguments for
the thoroughly conceptual nature of human mentality. In this article, I speak
only for myself, leaving it to readers to wonder whether McDowell and
Brewer would agree with my suggestions, if readers might be so inclined.
My task is how to make us genuinely confront our commitments rather
than only the details of competing proposals – all in the space of an article.
This is the challenge that this article faces.
Yet the stakes are even higher. To explain, I should acknowledge having
already made some attempts at coaxing the debate away from a normal focus
on details to discussion of constitutive commitments. But it seems those
attempts were not recognizable as discussions of nonconceptual contents for
the most part. To show what does not seem to work, let me mention how
those attempts went. One article explicitly tried to shift attention from the
details of current proposals to background commitments by counterpoising
Sellars’ and Wittgenstein’s ideas about perception.2 The idea was to con-
front some of Wittgenstein’s ‘outside of any paradigm’ investigations of
perception with Sellars’ work. Sellars is the foil because it was his influen-
tial work in the 1950’s that set-up ‘business as usual’ for the remainder of
                                                
2 Sedivy, (2004a) “Wittgenstein’s Diagnosis of Empiricism’s Third Dogma: Why percep-
tion is not an amalgam of sensation and conceptualization.”
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the twentieth century, and now apparently, for the twenty-first as well. That
is, after a crystalline and virtuoso demolition of the “framework of given-
ness,” Sellars opts for the conservative option of rehabilitating sensory im-
pressions as purely causal ingredients of experience by cleansing away any
epistemic role. I, at least, find this trajectory stunning – powerful, poignant,
for better and for worse.
In another attempt, I argued for thinking about personal contents – or
simply, the mind – as contents that lack vehicles.3 Part of the point of that
alternative way of thinking about ourselves is that it is part and parcel of
showing that personal contents are conceptual that there is nothing like
nonconceptual content at the ‘personal level’ – since that is one form of a
content/vehicle confusion.
The discussion, needless to say, remains one about the details of pro-
posals (a list of ever-growing references is surely not needed to prove this
point). One might just note how John McDowell's proposal that all content
is conceptual is treated within debates over nonconceptual content. Such
debates proceed swiftly to the details of McDowell's proposal about demon-
strative concepts – perhaps with a nod to McDowell's exclusively 'epis-
temic' motivation – without considering what is surely something of a sea
change in our understanding of persons and world.4
So the full challenge for this article is: how might one address the is-
sues so they connect recognizably with more normal debates over noncon-
ceptual content and so they rechannel those debates towards underlying is-
sues?
For better or for worse, given the need for brevity, this paper will focus
the discussion in the following three steps. The opening section sets-up the
issues with a brief examination of perceptual experience from the first per-
son viewpoint. My proposal is that perception is a mode of engagement
with individuals and properties to the level of determinacy relevant for hu-
                                                
3 Sedivy, (2004b), “Minds: Contents without Vehicles.”
4 For very recent examples, see Kelly (2001) and Heck Jr. (2000). Here is Kelly’s state-
ment: “McDowell and Brewer … are motivated by a certain kind of epistemological concern
… by the need to make sense of our capacity to have beliefs with empirical content – that is,
beliefs that are grounded in, or justified by, experience.( p. 402)” Here is Heck: “…
McDowell argues that perceptual experience must be within “the space of reasons,” that
perception must be able to give us reasons for, that is, to justify, our beliefs about the world:
And, according to him, no state that does not have conceptual content can be a reason for a
belief. (p. 483)” To sum it all up, here is the sub-entry on “Conceptualist Views of Content”
from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “The Contents of Perception.”
“McDowell (1994), Sedivy (1996) and Brewer (1999) … defend [experience conceptualism
and the same-content thesis] on the grounds that experiences can provide justification for
beliefs only if these theses are true. Peacocke (2001a), Byrne (1996), Heck (2000) and oth-
ers have objected to these ‘epistemic’ defenses of experience conceptualism...”
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man (or animal) complex activity. The second section goes on to explain
perceptual engagement with the world by carefully examining Gareth Evans’
work in Varieties of Reference. Gareth Evans is usually held up as suggest-
ing nonconceptual contents way back when in the early 1980’s. Yet he also
tried to suggest that the best in Frege can marry the best in Russell. The
issue here is that though Evans’ suggestion of nonconceptual contents is
often cited, the larger project within which that proposal occurs is not. But
it is the larger project that opens the more radical theoretical space that con-
ceptualist positions occupy. Evans tried to show that we are capable of
genuinely singular thought that involves individuals under modes of presen-
tation. This is precisely what conceptualists propose: that perception is a
genuinely singular representational capacity that involves individuals – and
their properties as well, of course – under modes of presentation. Was Evans
mistaken in the whole point of Varieties of Reference while managing to
interject one sensible proposal? Making good sense of Evans’ overarching
project yields resources from philosophy of language with which to explain
the sort of perceptual content that careful phenomenological scrutiny reveals
in the first section.
If we can see our way to countenancing that perceptual content is best
understood as a true marriage of Frege and Russell – not merely a marriage
of convenience – the chief problem that confronts the conceptualist proposal
is that perceptual experiences do not seem to satisfy the ‘re-identification’
condition on conceptual contents. This is a problem because it is a hallmark
of conceptual contents that insofar as one can identify something one can
also re-identify it. The third and final section solves the problem and elimi-
nates the principal objection to the conceptualist proposal in normal de-
bates. My solution turns on showing that the problem cases where re-
identification fails in fact point to the conceptual nature of perceptual en-
gagement.
2 Perceptual Engagement with the World
Let’s start by examining what perceptual experience is like from the first
person viewpoint. Three principal features (or aspects) stand out. All three
strike me with equal wonder though not all three receive airtime in theoreti-
cal discussions of perception. I see individual members of kinds and deter-
minate instances of properties and what I see I cannot retain – let alone re-
call – in its determinacy as my eyes move away.
Consider walking through a fall forest ablaze with colorful leaves all
around. The myriad irregular superposed shapes and colors – of leaves,
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twigs, berries and branches – are present to me in their determinacy and in
my understanding of them. To note this is to note the following. (i) It is
always something that I see rather than a “?” that belongs to no category at
my disposal (since an I-know-not-what-it-is is as richly informed by my
understanding as the leaves or deer that I might see). This is the dreaded con-
ceptualist bit. (ii) What I see, I see determinately (since even a blurry grey
fog or blurry lettering is determinately blurry just as it is).5  This is my
proposal concerning the well agreed upon ‘richness’ of perceptual experi-
ence. But in this paper, my argument for the property-involving nature of
human perception starts from a yet unnoted third aspect: (iii) determinacy is
not retained as the eyes move away.
Consider my forest walk again. Often, I cannot help but stop and try to
take in all that beauty, to impress it within myself so that I might remem-
ber it. What I find is that I cannot retain the determinately detailed scene
within myself across the instant that I look away, only to look back again
immediately. This is true of all perception; we just do not notice this fact or
highlight it when we turn to theorizing about perception. You can examine
whether this is true of your perception – anytime, anywhere. You will find
that from moment to moment you cannot retain a preceding perceptual expe-
rience in its determinacy once you look away – let alone recall it with equal
determinacy days or months later. This is true however ‘simple’ or ‘com-
plex’ the content of the perceptual experience might be – a single leaf or
blade of grass, or a forest vista.
The datum that needs explaining is that: one is not able to retain or
maintain a perceptual experience with equal determinacy as one’s eyes shift
away, let alone to remember or recall the experience (after some interval)
with the same determinacy as the original. I am suggesting that careful scru-
tiny of lived experience shows that there is an important lacuna in our ini-
tial theoretical descriptions of perceptual experience and hence in the cata-
logue of issues that theory of perception needs to address both experimen-
tally and philosophically. The inability to retain or maintain our perceptual
experiences is important theoretically because it indicates that perceptual
content is object- and property-involving rather than self-standing. That is,
the best explanation of our inability to retain a perceptual experience in its
determinacy is that such experience involves its objects and properties. This
is my suggestion. To point to the best explanation is to point to a much
needed avenue of future research. (Though there are experimental findings
that already bear on this phenomenological datum. For example, one line of
                                                
5 Please see my “Perceptual Engagement with the World” for an extended discussion of
this point..
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research that seems relevant concerns change blindness, our inability to no-
tice changes in a scene to which we have had long exposure.6 )
Consider that self-standing representational content -- that does not de-
pend on its objects and properties causally and does not involve the objects
and properties in the representational content – can be maintained or recalled
in the absence of the represented individuals and properties. The hallmark of
such contents is that they can be entertained in the absence of the represented
objects and properties and hence recalled in their absence as well. What af-
fects our ability to entertain and recall self-standing contents in the absence
of the represented individuals and properties are contingent factors of repre-
sentational cost, storage and access. These are the sorts of factors that affect
retrieval. But the failure to retain a perceptual experience in its original de-
terminate detail cannot be explained as a failure to recall self-standing con-
tents that is owing to contingent factors that affect retrieval. This is because
the factors that affect retrieval – such as the “costliness” of storing complex
content and organizational problems of storing complex content in a way
that allows for efficient access – do not come into effect in the momentary
interval as one’s eyes shift.
Perceptual experience confronts us with two problems, only one of
which might be explainable in terms of memory deficits, even the sorts of
deficits that affect short term memory. To be sure, perceptual experiences
cannot be recalled with matching determinacy. But I am suggesting that
perceptual experience poses a hard issue that must not be conflated with
questions about recall: why does the determinate detail of perceptual experi-
ence outrun our ability to retain or maintain it? Is it because there is simply
too much detail to store even for a momentary interval? Or is it because the
experience involves the objects and properties so that when the objects and
properties are no longer involved, the determinate detail is not available ei-
ther? What is the better explanation? If the determinate detail is available
during the experience because the experience is awareness of a representation
that is not object-involving – then that representation cannot be too costly
to maintain for another split second because precisely that cost has been
feasible up to the moment the eyes turn away. 7
                                                
6 See O'Regan, J.K., Rensink, R.A., Clark, J.J. (1999); Rensink, R.A., O'Regan, J.K., Clark,
J.J., (1997).
7 Here is a simple illustrative way to cast this point that raises an instructive objection. If I
(or rather, my sub-personal Central Nervous System or CNS processes) could make my own
pictures or movies at the determinate detail of perceptual experience, and if perceptual ex-
perience really is experience of such movies, then there is no reason I couldn’t hold onto and
‘watch’ – or at least utilize – a given ‘frame’ of such a movie a split second longer. If rele-
vant subpersonal CNS processes make determinate movies, there should not be the differ-
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The hypothesis at issue is that perception is determinate and that its de-
terminacy is an object- and property involving kind of content. One relevant
consideration is that complex action must deal with change as it occurs in
real-time. The activity in the first person datum I offered – that of looking at
the leaves of trees while walking along a peaceful forest trail – does not
raise in any obvious way the need for dealing with change as it occurs. But
any number of different examples could be raised where this need would be
vivid – such as hunting a deer in that same forest, or preferably, watching
birds, or skiing down its icy hillsides after the leaves have fallen – as well
as examples that switch scenarios altogether such as our need to drive on
multi-lane highways at 120 km/h. Yet when it comes to the functional
unity – or constitutive interdependence — of perception and action, exam-
ples drawn from animal life seem more vivid. We might turn to the daily
dance of the food chain among gazelles and their kin with lions and cheetahs
on an African savannah. The ambient habitat for all of these animals is
filled with ever so slightly moving stripes and spots – of leaves, of grass, of
shadows, of light, of other animals, friend and foe alike. Everything blurs
and shimmers slightly with the rising heat. All parties need to note any
unusual movement of potentially any of the myriad stripes or spots, how-
ever slight, as it occurs – so as to burst into chase or flight. How is this
best achieved?
By continuous update of representational content that does not involve
the individuals and properties? Or by presenting the individuals and proper-
ties? That is, by content that depends on and involves the individuals and
properties? Considering the costliness of updating a representation of such a
complex natural scene – and the organizational difficulty of ensuring imme-
diate access to just the needed portion of the ambient scene (also known as
the frame problem) – suggests that the best solution to the problem, and
hence the best explanation, is that animals are perceptually engaged with
their habitat, engagements that involve the individuals and properties that
their activities concern. The inter-dependence of perception and action indi-
cates that the best explanation for real-time activity is that it is mutually
supported by and supports object- and property-involving representations –
                                                                                                      
ences that we can note at every moment of our waking lives. This is my point. But someone
might object that when we watch movies in movie theatres, what we see are discrete frames
(or pictures) with a shuttered interval of 13 milliseconds between each frame. This seems to
suggest that we do retain an image for a small time interval – 13 milliseconds. But who is the
“we” in question? Movie-watching demonstrates that: (i) human subpersonal processes can
maintain an image for 13 milliseconds; whereas (ii) a person does not detect intervals of 13
milliseconds. The phenomenological datum stands. As a person turns her eyes away, she can
no longer retain what she just saw in anything like the determinate detail of the experience
itself. Many thanks to William Seager for raising this objection.
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representations that up-date ‘for free’ with the changing nature of the sur-
roundings. Such representations change as the world changes – thanks to the
world.8  
I am invoking two ideas that are fraught with difficulty to explain the
nature of perceptual experience at the first person perspective: that perceptual
experience is determinate and that it is a mode of engagement. Explaining
engagement is the work of the next section. To avert any misunderstanding
from the outset, let’s close this section with a couple of points about deter-
minacy and determinate properties. It is important to note that the concept
highlights what might seem to be two different points about perception, yet
is really one. First, individuals and their properties are determinate. It might
be helpful to note that definite and determinate are related concepts. What are
‘out there’ in the world are determinate or definite individuals and their prop-
erties. Insofar as complex activity requires engagement with individuals and
properties, then it is with determinate individuals and determinate properties
that complex animals engage. But this is not the only relevant factor when
we consider perception. Perceptual experience is not simply individual- and
property-dependent, it is a mode of engagement – as we have already noted
and as I will argue. It is not simply the determinate individuals and their
properties ‘out there, in the world’ that our perceptions depend on causally,
but those individuals and properties under relevant perceptual modes of pres-
entation (to put the point using one set of well-known philosophical re-
sources). This is to stress that perceptual engagement is a representational
capacity. What we enjoy perceptually is content, albeit a distinctive individ-
ual- and property-involving content that presents individuals and properties
perceptually. Perceptual content is distinguished by its qualitative richness.
This is the second fact that the notion of determinacy captures. Perception’s
qualitative richness is predominantly cast as a richness of information. But
to say that perceptual engagement is determinate – in that it presents and
involves determinate individuals and properties – is to say that the qualita-
tive richness of our experience is in the world rather than something we
have ‘received’ along an informational channel (or something that super-
venes on what we have received along an informational channel, etc). When
it comes to perception, the two senses of determinacy belong together. The
                                                
8 Though I cannot expand on this point within the scope of the present paper, I hope it is
clear that conceptualism is in step with the growing trend in theories of mind to explain per-
ception as a functional unity with activity, and to explain ourselves as “embodied and embed-
ded” – indeed, my approach adds fuel to this fire. See for example, Hurley (1998) and
Haugeland (1998).
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notion of determinacy relates the ‘richness’ of perceptual content and the
world-involving nature of such content.
Before I go on to make this case in detail, here is a summary of what
this introductory section aimed to accomplish. In the first instance, the aim
was to show that what philosophers have recently been referring to as the
richly detailed nature of perceptual content is just what it seems – engage-
ment with determinate properties in the world. And there is nothing about
engagement with determinate properties that suggests that such a capability
is not or cannot be conceptual. To point to the broad outlines of an explana-
tion of the way in which determinate property-involving content is concep-
tual, let’s turn to the work of Gareth Evans – as paradoxical as this may
seem.
3 Gareth Evans and Fregean Singular Thought:
the Letter and the Spirit
Proposals for nonconceptual contents often cite Gareth Evans’ suggestion in
The Varieties of Reference that perceptual experience has nonconceptual
content.9 Presumably, part of the point of such references is to show that
even a theorist who suggests that we are capable of genuinely singular, con-
ceptual thought of individuals did not go so far as to suggest that the richly
detailed attributive aspect of our thoughts or experiences could be both genu-
inely singular and conceptual.
To be sure, Gareth Evans suggested that nonconceptual content figures
in explanations of persons rather than their subpersonal parts (whereas posit-
ing nonconceptual content in explanations of subpersonal processes can be
common ground between conceptualists and nonconceptualists). But to as-
sess what we should do with that suggestion today, we need to consider the
broader project within which that suggestion figured.
Evans’s project was and still is ground-breaking in its overarching aim:
to show that genuinely singular thought has Fregean senses or modes of
presentation that identify individuals in the world and not merely some deni-
zens of our own minds, such as the sense data to which Russell felt himself
compelled to retreat. What Evans was trying to show in The Varieties of
Reference is that the best in Frege, as it were, is consonant with the best in
Russell. The leading insights of Frege and Russell – that senses or modes of
presentation determine the individuation of mental contents, and that there
are genuinely singular contents that involve what they represent – are not at
odds but can be combined to yield the understanding that there is genuinely
                                                
9 Evans , G., 1982.
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singular thought: thought that is conceptual, that is individuated by its dis-
criminating understanding of individuals and that involves the represented
worldly individuals.
This was Evans’s radical project. If he could make it work, then it sug-
gests the possibility that thought and experience can be genuinely singular –
conceptual and world-involving – not only in their referential but also in
their attributive capacities. His project suggests this possibility even if he
himself did not explore it at the time he wrote The Varieties of Reference.
But given his project, the possibility becomes available – even readily
available. Finding the combination that unlocks Pandora’s box frees all of
its inhabitants and possibilities.
Here, in minimal outline before we pursue details, is the way in which
Evans brings Russell’s and Frege’s insights together. Evans holds that Rus-
sell was correct that there are thoughts or contents that can only be thought
if their referent exists. There are Russellian singular terms as well as
thoughts: “whose sense depends upon their having a referent” (p.46). But
Evans proposes that such thoughts have 'Fregean' senses, that is, that what
determines the contents of Russellian singular thoughts is the subject's
mode of identifying or individuating the referent. Evans believes that it is
another Russellian thesis that directs us to ascribe 'Fregean' senses to singu-
lar thoughts. If we agree with Russell's principle that “a subject cannot
make a judgment about something unless he knows which object his judg-
ment is about” (p.89), then it will follow that a subject cannot think about
a particular object without having the ability to identify that object. Rus-
sell's principle suggests that the capacity to think singular thoughts in-
volves the capacity to identify the objects of those thoughts; it involves
some form of individuating knowledge about those objects. The principle
suggests, quite sensibly, no more than “that to entertain a thought, one
must know what it would be for the thought to be true.” (McDowell, 1990,
p.256). In a nutshell, Evans' thesis is that the content of a particular
thought is determined by the subject's mode of identifying the object, so
that the possibility of the thought depends upon the success of that identifi-
cation. In the case of demonstrative thoughts of particulars or individuals,
Evans argues that it is our understanding of an individual’s spatial location
that allows us to identify it in a way that uniquely individuates it. The fun-
damental identification of individuals is a form of spatial thought and such
thought, Evans argues, depends on the subject's capacity to be actively en-
gaged with those objects.
This is one of Evans’ principal contentions, one that is key for our pur-
poses. Evans argues that our spatial thought is a form of understanding
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rather than a reliable discriminatory capacity. He tries to show that spatial
identification is a conceptual grasp of an object’s location both in relation to
oneself and in a more ‘objective’ or holistic mapping. Because the grasp has
a necessarily egocentric component, Evans argues, it is object-involving
content rather than the sort of self-standing content that does not involve the
represented individual. Yet it requires conceptual understanding. This strand
in Evans’ work – the idea that our awareness of spatial particulars integrates
two modes of identification, an egocentric and a holistic one – has figured in
subsequent interest in the nature of spatial representation and spatial
thought. Much empirical and philosophical work has come together on this
topic.10 It would be fair to say that there is some agreement that spatial
representation combines egocentric and holistic identifications of spatial
particulars as Evans’ suggested.
The significance for theories of perception is quite clear. It is not only
individuals but also their properties that are spatially located. What if Evans
is correct that our ability to discriminate or individuate spatial particulars (i)
is a form of understanding for which a reliable causal process is necessary
but not sufficient; (ii) that yields content that is “in part” egocentric, involv-
ing both the subject and the individual? If this line of thought is correct,
then it might apply no less to the properties of individuals than to the indi-
viduals.
What is the difference between individuals and properties? Individual in-
stances of properties are instances of kinds. This is to say that they are both
determinate particulars and members of kinds. To experience a determinate
instance of a property is to experience: a spatially located particular that
belongs to a kind so that other individuals might have determinate instances
of this kind. But Evans argues that singular thought of spatial individuals
requires that we grasp both the unique individuality of that object, as it
were, and its membership in a kind (at least the kind: object or individual
that might have a variety of properties located at x). This will be clearer
when I detail his account of conceptual capacities as essentially re-
combinatory along attributive and referential dimensions respectively – a
capacity is conceptual insofar it allows a subject to attribute different proper-
ties to one object and to attribute the same property to different objects. If
Evans is on the right track about the referentially and attributively recombi-
natory nature of conceptual capacities – which entails some grasp that indi-
viduals are potential bearers of different properties and that properties poten-
tially characterize different individuals – and if he is on the right track about
                                                
10 For example, see Spatial Representation, edited by Eilan, N., McCarthy R., and Brewer,
B., 1993.
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the nature of spatial identification, he supplies a fruitful model for both the
referential and attributive functions of perceptual content.11
But is Evans’ project on the right track? He faces an uphill struggle to
convince us on both key points: (i) that spatial identification is a variety or
form of understanding, and (ii) that spatial thought involves its objects. If
he can marshal a convincing case for both, he explains that we are capable
of genuinely singular thought of spatial particulars – and provides a model
for perceptual engagement.
Despite its apparently uncontroversial nature, let’s start from Evans’ un-
derstanding of conceptual capacities in terms of their generality. Note that he
does not claim to give an exhaustive account of what makes capacities con-
ceptual.
In discussing the nature of our conceivings we have little enough to go
on, but there is one fundamental constraint that must be observed in all
our reflections: I shall call it ‘The Generality Constraint.” (p.100)
Here is Evans’ summary statement:
if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must
have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G,
for every property of being G of which he has a conception. This is the
condition that I call “The Generality Constraint”. (p. 104)
Though many theorists – including many who propose nonconceptual con-
tents – endorse this constraint, it is not clear that they share the approach to
concepts as capacities or abilities that this often-cited summary was intended
to encapsulate.
Consider Evans’ detailed development of this idea. Evans suggests that
thought must be structured not in the sense that subjects use “symbols,” or
more generally that thoughts are “composed of elements,” but in the sense
that a thought is a “complex of abilities” (p. 101). Evans uses linguistic
understanding as an analogy to show that insofar as a subject can understand
the sentences ‘Fa’ and ‘Gb’ – or entertain the thoughts ‘Fa’ or ‘Gb’ – she
can also understand the sentences ‘Fb’ and ‘Ga,’ and there is a common ex-
planation of her understanding of ‘Fa’ and ‘Ga’ and of her understanding of
‘Fb’ and ‘Gb’. Similarly, there is a “common partial explanation for a sub-
ject’s having the thought that a is F and his having the thought that a is G:
                                                
11 To avert misunderstanding here is an important qualification. To argue that Evans is on
the right track is not to say that his work on singular thought of spatial particulars gives us all
the resources we need to understand determinate instances of properties. What he provides is
a model, a model that we need to elaborate, refine and bring together with a broad range of
empirical research concerning the subpersonal processes that enable perceptual engage-
ment. I will return to taking Evans’ work as something like a model shortly.
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there is a single state whose possession is a necessary condition for the oc-
currence of both thoughts” (p. 102). Moreover, “each of the abilities in-
volved in the thought that a is F, though separable, can be exercised only in
a (whole) thought – and hence always together with some other conceptual
ability. This is the analogue of the fact that the understanding of a word is
manifested only in the understanding of sentences, and hence always together
with the understanding of other words” (p. 102).
The disanalogy between thoughts and sentences is that while sentences
might be unstructured, thoughts are essentially structured. Evans suggests
that we can imagine introducing a one-word sentence by stipulation to have
a meaning that would normally be expressed by a structured sentence.12 In
contrast,
it simply is not a possibility for the thought that a is F to be unstruc-
tured – that is, not to be the exercise of two distinct abilities. It is a fea-
ture of the thought-content that John is happy that to grasp it requires
distinguishable skills. In particular it requires possession of the con-
cept of happiness – knowledge of what it is for a person to be happy;
and that is something not tied to this or that particular person’s happi-
ness. (pp.102-103)
[A]ny thought […] having the content that a is F involves the exercise
of an ability – knowledge of what it is for something to be F – which
would be exercised in indefinitely many distinct thoughts, and would be
exercised in, for instance, the thought that b is F. Similarly for the
thought that a is G. And this of course implies the existence of a corre-
sponding kind of ability, the ability to think of a particular object. For
there must be a capacity which, when combined with a knowledge of
what it is in general for an object to be F, yields the ability to entertain
the thought that a is F, or at least a knowledge of what it is, or would
be, for a to be F. … (p.103)
We thus see the thought that a is F as lying at the intersection of two
series of thoughts: on the one hand, the series of thoughts that a is F,
that b is F, that c is F, [and so on], and, on the other hand, the series of
thoughts that a is F, that a is G, and that a is H, [and so on]. (p.104,
footnote 21)
But here is more:
Even readers not persuaded that any system of thought must conform to
the Generality Constraint may be prepared to admit that the system of
                                                
12 I think that Evans has in mind something along the lines of Wittgenstein’s point at the
bottom of page 18e in the Philosophical Investigations.
“Can I say “bububu” and mean “If it does not rain I shall go for a walk?” – It is only in a
language that I can mean something by something. This shews clearly that the grammar of
“to mean” is not like that of the expression “to imagine” and the like.”
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thought we possess – the system that underlies our use of language –
does conform to it. (It is one of the fundamental differences between
human thought and the information-processing that takes place in our
brains that the Generality Constraint applies to the former but not the
latter. When we attribute to the brain computations whereby it local-
izes the sounds we hear, we ipso facto ascribe to it representations of
the speed of sound and of the distance between the ears, without any
commitment to the idea that it should be able to represent the speed of
light or the distance between anything else.) (p. 104, footnote 22)
In short, a capacity is conceptual if it is recombinatory along referential and
attributive dimensions: if it involves grasping that a property of a certain
object “is not tied to this or that” individual object, and that a particular
object might have other properties as well as those being perceived or con-
sidered. (I shall drop the qualification “along referential and attributive di-
mensions respectively” from here, using the shorter phrase that our capaci-
ties are recombinatory to stand for Evans’ precise idea of the specific recom-
binatorial capacity at issue for conceptuality). Such re-combinatorial capaci-
ties distinguish human thought from the adaptive discriminatory capacities
that enable the coupling of animals with their habitats. It is such re-
combinatorial capacities that constitute our grasp of objects as possessing
various properties and of properties as the features of various objects.
Evans points out that with this account of the conceptual as a theoreti-
cal background or framework, Russell’s belief in the importance of individu-
ating knowledge should not seem controversial. It is simply or “truistically
enough” “the idea that, in order for a subject to be credited with the thought
that p, he must know what it is for it be the case that p.” (p. 105) His point
is that we can start from uncontroversial premises about concepts to reach
conclusions that go against the flow of theories of reference. The premises’
good sense should give one pause – at the very least – when it comes to
reacting against the conclusions.
Evans takes the Russellian idea – that to think about something requires
knowing what you are thinking about – to argue for a fundamental “level”
of thought – or better an aspect of thought or a capacity wherein we grasp a
ground of difference that is “fundamental” in that it distinguishes a particular
object of a certain kind from all others.
For any object whatever then, there is what may be called the funda-
mental ground of difference of that object (at a time). This will be a
specific answer to the question ‘What differentiates that object from
others?’ of the kind appropriate to objects of that sort. For example,
the fundamental ground of difference of the number three is being the
third number in the series of numbers; the fundamental ground of differ-
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ence of the shape square is having four equal sides joined at right an-
gles, and so on. (p. 107)
Evans believes that “we do very often employ such fundamental Ideas of
objects in our thinking about them, but even when we do not, I want to
suggest that such Ideas play a very central role in our thinking.” (pp. 107-8)
Together, the Generality Constraint and the innocuous thought that to
think about a particular object one must be able to individuate an object,
lead to the conclusion that demonstrative thoughts that depend on on-going
informational contact with an object require understanding for which the
informational contact is not sufficient. That is, when Evans turns to demon-
strative thought of individuals with these commitments in place, he is in a
position to show that an on-going causal link is necessary but not suffi-
cient.
It is the spatiality of such objects that renders an informational-link in-
sufficient. In and of itself, a camera-like connection with an object cannot
supply the understanding of “what makes it the case that an object, distin-
guished as the occupant of a position in space, is that object.” (p. 149) An
organism might be able “to respond differentially to those different values of
the proximal stimulus which code the direction” of the input, without being
able to represent the input spatially. The ability to respond differentially to
spatial stimuli is not sufficient to attribute to the organism the ability to
represent those stimuli as being located at different distal positions in space.
Rather, the subject needs to have some understanding of what makes it
the case that the object she has in mind is a certain object out there at a
unique position in space. What is at issue is a nexus of capacities to which
activity is crucial. Self-initiated activity is important in that it allows a sub-
ject, take me for example, to integrate an egocentric mode of identifying the
object – relative to myself, as it were on axes that radiate outwards from my
potentialities for action – with an objective or holistic mapping that locates
the object with respect to others. Such integration is possible insofar as I
grasp myself as a physical object among others. But note that I do so
through the mutually constitutive inter-dependence between an irreducibly
egocentric mode of identification and an objective mode of identification.
Evans argues that one can have an objective mode of identification only
insofar as one has an egocentric one – and vice versa – one can only have an
egocentric mode of identification insofar as one has an objective one. This is
because it is spatial particulars that are being identified, oneself and other
objects, and there is only one objective space, but we only grasp that space
through our own activity. Moreover, generality concerning spatial particu-
lars – about oneself as an object among others as well as about other indi-
vidual objects – requires that one can integrate an egocentric mode of
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thought with an objective one and the egocentric one can only arise from
activity. This yields Evans’ radical conclusion: that demonstrative thought
of spatial particulars has objective reference and a partially egocentric sense.
Thought of spatio-temporal particulars is genuinely singular in the sense
that: (i) it requires an on-going informational link; (ii) has objective refer-
ence to objects in public space; (iii) an objective reference that is secured by
a discriminating understanding that is partially egocentric.
If Evans’ analysis is correct – and it is, at the very least, an insightful
and theoretically suggestive analysis – it offers a way to understand that
demonstrative spatial thought is a conceptual contentful capacity that in-
volves its objects. This is what I characterized as Evans’ radical, overarching
aim and what I needed to extract from Evans’ account so as to apply it to
perceptual content. Two questions remain: why does Evans not extend this
analysis of demonstrative thought to perception, and is there good reason to
extend his approach nevertheless?
Why does Evans not extend this same sort of account to the content of
perceptual experience? Despite his commitment to generality, Evans sub-
scribes to something like ‘order-effects’ when it comes to conceptual capaci-
ties. One might discuss constitutive underlying commitments for this view.
But in this paper, let’s just consider what happens if we believe that concep-
tual capacities admit something like temporal, transformative ‘order-effects’
– and what happens if we do not. This is a divergence between Evans and a
conceptualist like myself that does not undercut agreement over the radical
aims of his project.
What do I mean by ‘order-effects’? Very simply, this is the view that
when conceptual capacities are involved perception, such capacities concep-
tual-ize – they conceptual-ize an aspect or ingredient of mental life that is
not conceptual to yield perceptual judgment. This is precisely Evans’ pre-
supposition about perception.
The informational states which a subject acquires through perception
are non-conceptual, or non-conceptualized. Judgments based upon such
states necessarily involve conceptualization: in moving from a percep-
tual experience to a judgment about the world (usually expressible in
some verbal form), one will be exercising basic conceptual skills. […]
The process of conceptualization or judgment takes the subject from
his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain
kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of
cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual
content). (p. 227)
Is there an alternative? How might conceptual capacities be in play if not in
a way that allows for a transformative ordering – a before and after, that ‘be-
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fore and after’ pictures display – such as Evans has in mind with the notion
of ‘conceptualization’?
To discuss what is at issue in a short space, let’s borrow an image from
Sellars (though not the account wherein the image figures).13 What about
the ‘chess-entry’ move that starts off a game of chess? Or the language-entry
move that starts off a discussion, as when I might say “look, that poppy is
blue!” Is there a transformative ordering, a ‘before-and-after’ in either case?
Sellars’ image of an “entry” or an entry-move is useful because it pulls
in both directions, presupposing the logic of ‘before-and-after’ pictures while
pulling away from it as well. Sellars’ image clearly invites discussion that
presupposes that we are in a logical dimension where ordering is possible.
After all, making an entrance presupposes a before and after – that is just
what the idea of entering is all about, I enter from somewhere to somewhere
else. The image of an entry is the image of a transition, of passing from one
state to another as when we pass from one room to another, or from the
outdoors into a familiar house. Evans is not alone in supposing that an en-
trance is made from the nonconceptual to the space of judgments. The image
of a ‘chess-entry move’ invites precisely the view that Evans shares with
many other theorists: an ‘entry-move’ ‘takes’ something that is not chess,
applies the rules and voilà: ‘it’s a pawn moving to...’ Similarly, when a
subject sees that ‘that poppy is blue,’ the subject moves from a perceptual
experience to a judgment, moving by means of a “process of conceptualiza-
tion” from an informational state (with nonconceptual content) to a cogni-
tive state (with conceptual content).
But do I chess-ualize when I begin a game? Does chess-ualization occur
when the game begins? The idea of a ‘game-entry’ move – for beginning or
initiating a game – pushes us away from the ‘before-and after’ image even
while the seductive pull of that imagery is pre-supposed. Of course there is a
transition – in some sense – from not playing chess to playing chess. But
the issue is, in starting the game, do rules begin to apply that did not apply
before, taking the board (like Evans’ subject) from being in one kind of state
– one where the rules of chess do not yet apply – to another kind of state –
where the rules do apply?
It is not that the rules of chess do not apply and then begin to apply.
Rather, they always apply so long as one has the requisite abilities. Some-
times we initiate a game using the rules. More often than not when it
                                                
13 Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games,” 1963. In this paper, Sellars develops
his own very precise proposal about rule-following in general and language in particular –
using notions such as language entry transitions and language departure transitions –  which
he refers back to Wittgenstein’s locus classicus in his title; though when he does refer to
another philosopher’s work on rule-following within the paper, it is rather to Gilbert Ryle’s
Concept of Mind.
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comes to chess we do not – we play games of chess only intermittently,
after all. But when we initiate a game we do not ‘transform’ what is not yet
a chess board with chess pieces. When I start to play a game, I do so insofar
as I grasp the rules and it is the fact that I grasp the rules that makes my
movement a move in the game – perhaps the first move, which is our focus
here. It is the background of capacities that I have – which are in no sense
all being deployed – which make a certain motion a chess move. How are
those capacities relevant? To start a game is to activate or bring a certain
region of rules ‘into play’, pardon the pun. Why the metaphor? We need to
talk of potentialities with the caveat that there are many unwanted resonat-
ing echoes in this domain (one might think of dispositions, for just one
example). But this is the region of logical space we need to explore to hit
on just the right explanation, a region that is different from the region of
‘before and after’ pictures that involve transitions in the sense of transforma-
tions.
Just as the image of a transformation is not apt for what occurs when
one begins a game of chess, so the image is not apt for what occurs as one
makes a ‘perceptual judgment’ – or preferably, what occurs as one sees that
a poppy is, very surprisingly, blue. We need to work on good ways to make
this point. One way to make it might use Evans’ idea of the Generality
Constraint. Does this come as a surprise? Suppose I point out a blue poppy
to you saying, “That poppy is blue!” What makes this a meaningful utter-
ance? It is meaningful insofar as I could say more of the same – more rele-
vant claims that recombine along referential and attributive dimensions re-
spectively as Evans suggested. One might add that my exclamation is mean-
ingful insofar as other statements (or exclamations, questions, requests, etc.)
are standing ready to be spoken if it became reasonable or rationally appro-
priate to do so. Though this last qualification about appropriateness adds
imagery to Evans’ Generality Constraint, it comes to the same. Recall that
according to Evans, a meaningful sentence lies “at the intersection of two
series of thoughts.” The intersection is not between actual series, but be-
tween potential series – series that a subject could entertain or has the capac-
ity to entertain. A sentence lies at such an intersection insofar as the subject
has more of the same to say and to think – along the referential and attribu-
tive dimensions. And a subject would say or think more if it became appro-
priate to do so or if she chose to go on to do so. To return to our example,
what is standing in readiness is more of the same – the capacity to think or
to say “That poppy is true blue! How rare! Just like the blue of my delphin-
ium.” or “That poppy is exquisite.” or perhaps “Are you sure that is true
blue, it is very shady here.”
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Note that if it is the fact that there is more of the same that I could say
that makes what I do say meaningful, this holds whether what I say is an
opening gambit or not. The same holds for chess. It is the fact that I can
make more appropriate (and related) moves that makes my opening gambit a
move that starts a game of chess. It is not that I take what is not yet a
chess-board and render it one with my opening gambit. I do not chess-ualize.
This core conceptualist commitment does not deny that perception is
special. What it denies is that what makes perception special is captured
with the image of an entry or a transition that takes us from one kind of
state to a very different one, as when one enters from the outdoors into the
familiar space of one’s house. What makes perception special is to be found
not in further refinements – or epicycles – of this old imagery and its atten-
dant logic. What makes perception special is that it is a mode of engage-
ment with individuals and their determinate properties.
And Evans is one theorist who gives us resources for understanding the
engagement that is special to perception, without any need to slip back into
the old imagery of transformations and ‘before-and-after’ pictures. Why not
take his radical insights as far as they will go? If there is a good respect of
analogy between the first move in a game of chess and a demonstrative ut-
terance that opens a conversation about what we both see, the further anal-
ogy to perceptual experiences is straightforward and should come as no sur-
prise. When I see that blue poppy, it is not the case that I conceptualize
what is not already a blue poppy in my experience. The logic of ‘before-and-
after pictures’ does not apply. (Though note that if one identifies (i) the ex-
ternal facts that figure in explanations of persons, with (ii) the external facts
that figure in explanations of their subpersonal processes – so that the ex-
ternal contextual facts that figure in explanations of persons are the same as
the external facts that figure in explanations of our subpersonal processes –
then the logic of transformations, of ‘before-and-after pictures’ is compul-
sory.14)
It would be a welcome bonus if someone whose commitments do not
already predispose them towards this view might find this sketch convinc-
ing. But that was not the task set for this discussion. The task was to iden-
tify a divergence in understanding of conceptual capacities between Evans
and a contemporary conceptualist, a divergence that does not undercut
agreement over the radical aims of Evans work. The difference I have identi-
fied is the divergence (whose motivations run as deep as any) that makes
Evans stop his account at judgments and that makes the conceptualist extend
Evans’ account to perceptual experiences. It is the difference that allows a
                                                
14 My “Perceptual Engagement with the World” develops an extended argument for this
point.
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conceptualist to share in Evans’ project while making one key departure:
changing Evans’ account of perceptual experience from an informational
state with nonconceptual content to an account of perceptual experience as
engagement that has conceptual object- and property-involving content. De-
nying that the conceptual admits a ‘before and after’ picture allows one to
take Evans’ radical project about demonstrative thought and turn it towards
perception as well.
To be more precise, what a conceptualist can do is to take the explana-
tory resources from Evans’ account of the content of demonstrative spatial
thought of individuals and use them for explaining perceptual content. Or
perhaps, somewhat more strongly, a conceptualist can consider the main
explanatory moves in Evans’ account of demonstratives as a fruitful model
for explaining the content of perceptual engagement.
It is important to be clear about this since it preempts the following
sort of objection. The charge can and has been laid that a conceptualist like
McDowell overlooks that experience cannot be constituted by demonstrative
concepts because demonstrative content is itself anchored by experience.15
Let’s take both aspects of this charge in turn: first, the presupposition that
demonstrative content is “anchored” by experience; second, the charge that
conceptualism holds that experience is “constituted” by demonstrative con-
cepts.
That experience “anchors” demonstrative concepts is one of the dividing
issues between nonconceptualism and conceptualism and so it cannot be
presupposed as an objection to conceptualism. Conceptualism takes a holis-
tic approach to beliefs and perceptions. Highlighting the holistic relations
among what I see and what I say – and what I think – stresses the mutual
inter-dependence among our capacities rather than a uni-directional flow from
perception ‘inwards.’ To the extent that conceptualism includes epistemic
and semantic holism, it offers an alternative package to the commitments
that the objection voices. Demonstrative concepts are just one among a
whole host of our capacities that need to be available in potentiality, that
                                                
15 See “Conceptualist Views of Content” (§6.1) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy for the summary statement of this charge, and Heck, Jr. (2000) for an elaborate devel-
opment of it. Aside from the charge that conceptualism cannot have it both ways, as it were –
that demonstrative concepts cannot both constitute experience and be anchored by experi-
ence – there seems to be widespread belief in at least one half of this conjunction: namely,
that conceptualism proposes that concepts constitute perceptual experience. Here is a repre-
sentative quotation from Kelly that opens his “Demonstrative Concepts and Experience”
(2001). “Their [the conceptualists] claim, more precisely, is that every perceptual experi-
ence is such that, of necessity, its content is constituted entirely by concepts possessed by the
subject having the experience.” (pp. 397-8).
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might be standing ready or perhaps even activated as we perceive.  To be
sure, I can only say “Look at that blue” if both you and I are looking at the
same poppy. But this does not require an explanation that posits that our
shared understanding of the demonstrative ‘that blue’ is based on or anchored
by our perceptions. Rather, our perceptions have a special role (epistemic in
part, if you will) insofar as they engage us with our surroundings – but they
can only be perceptions of objects and properties to the extent that they in-
volve individuating understanding of properties and objects. Though he al-
lowed his holistic account to stray into coherentism, Sellars had a wonderful
way of putting this point:
The metaphor of “foundation” is misleading in that it keeps us from
seeing that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical
propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical di-
mension in which the latter rest on the former.
Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One
seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests
on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great
Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does i t
all begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophis-
ticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation
but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in
jeopardy, though not all at once. (Sellars, 1997, pp.78-79.)
Secondly, nothing in my account suggests that demonstrative concepts
“constitute” perceptual experience. Indeed, my aim is to make clear the con-
ceptualist alternative. That is part of the point of presenting Evans’ ap-
proach in detail. Recall that Evans’ suggests that concepts are capacities and
that singular thought is a “complex” of capacities. Such capacities are con-
ceptual insofar as they satisfy certain fairly exacting requirements. To sug-
gest all this is to propose that singular thought is conceptual insofar as it is
a  “complex’ of capacities that satisfies the specified requirements. A range
of capacities is both activated and standing in the wings as I see with marvel
what I could express by saying “that poppy is true blue!” It is crucial to
such capacities that they allow recombination along both the referential and
attributive dimensions respectively – so that while I am looking at the
poppy, I might also recall the red and yellow and orange poppies I have
seen, or wonder whether this blue is really as true as the blue of my delphin-
ium. But it is important not to confuse the two conceptualist claims that (i)
I can only express what I see by using demonstrative concepts like “that
blue,” and that (ii) such demonstrative contents can be used as models for
explaining perceptual content; with the altogether different claim that de-
monstrative concepts constitute perceptual contents.  It is not conceptualism
that suggests that concepts literally constitute perceptual contents (whatever
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that might be). Explanations of linguistic content can stand as models for
accounts of other kinds of mental contents without any implication that
linguistic contents constitute those kinds of contents. There is good reason
why we have detailed analyses of different kinds of linguistic contents. Lan-
guage is a good – readily and publicly available – place to start. But once we
have such analyses, we can help ourselves to the theoretical resources they
offer in understanding contents that might seem a little more elusive – like
the contents of our thoughts, wishes, fears and perceptions. To use an ex-
planatory model is not to constitute what one is explaining out of the
model.
In short, a conceptualist approach like mine offers an alternative to the
view that demonstrative content is “anchored by” experience; and in no sense
implies that experience is “constituted” by demonstrative concepts. If I want
to express what I see, I need to use demonstrative concepts such as “that
blue.” This is not to claim that demonstrative concepts “constitute” percep-
tual experience.
To conclude, here at last is the view of perception that Evans makes
available. Like demonstrative thought, perceptual experience has ‘sense’ and
‘reference’: an objective reference and a sense that is egocentric in part. To
say this is to identify a kind of conceptual content or a range of conceptual
capacities. These capacities come together in our perceptual experience of
spatial objects – or as I would prefer to say, in our perceptual engagement
with spatial objects. When one perceives an object, one has individuating
understanding of the object’s location in space, both relative to one’s own
capacities for action and in relation to other objects. Active engagement
with objects yields such understanding because one’s awareness of oneself as
an individual in space among others and one’s perception of other individu-
als entail one another.
Now it is my turn to ask: why would not all this be true of our percep-
tion of the properties of these objects and not just of the objects them-
selves?
Objects and properties do not come apart. Properties are spatial particu-
lars – that belong to kinds that are not tied to this or that object – whereas
objects are spatial particulars that have a range of various properties. This is
the difference between properties and objects captured in Evans’ Generality
Constraint. But it is not a difference that renders Evans’ account of spatial
thought of objects inapplicable to determinate, spatially located properties. I
will elaborate shortly.
But first it is important to emphasize that my point throughout this sec-
tion is not to suggest that all we need for explaining perception is to be
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found in Evans’ Varieties of Reference. The point is to show that Evans
opens up a fruitful avenue for further research. The point is to show that
there is something quite precise and explanatorily adequate at work in the
conceptualist likening of perceptual content and demonstrative content.
Consider the conceptualist suggestion that perceptual content is like demon-
strative thought in both its referential and attributive functions, so that we
can explain the conceptual yet determinate nature of a perceptual experience
much like we would explain the demonstrative content “that is true blue.”
What such a conceptualist can have in mind – at the very least – is an ac-
count of spatial thought along the lines Evans makes available.
Suppose we do want to continue with Evans’ approach a little further –
in the clear understanding that conceptualists are not restricted only to
Evans’ account and invite others to join them in moving forward from this
model. Since Evans focuses on the sort of understanding requisite for identi-
fying an object, to extend his account to perception of properties, we need to
modify his account of the understanding that a perceiver needs to have. A
perceiver needs to have some understanding of what makes it the case that
the property she perceives is a certain determinate instance out there at a
unique position in space. (i) She needs to understand what it is for some-
thing to be x, happy or blue, for example. That is, she needs some under-
standing of the property at issue. (ii) She needs to be able to identify the
instance spatially. Her capacity to identify the instance spatially must be
recombinatory – it must involve grasping that the property “is not tied to
this or that” individual. That is, she must in some sense grasp that there are
other instances in order to grasp at all that what she sees is a property – just
as, according to Evans, she must grasp that the object she sees might have
other properties in order to grasp at all that it is an object she sees.
Consider my perceptual experience of a blue poppy. If I have some un-
derstanding of color, and if I can identify that blue of the poppy spatially,
then I have a perceptual grasp of that determinate instance that distinguishes
it from all others. Moreover, if Evans’ account of spatial identification is on
track, my perceptual experience – which I could express by saying “that
blue” – would have an objective reference with a partly egocentric sense.
Objects and properties do not come apart. This may seem a trivial point
but are we sure we recognize it in all its forms and implications? Evans’
account of the recombinatory nature of conceptual capacities makes this
point. A recombinatory grasp of an object entails that the object might have
a range of properties – it might have properties in addition to those currently
perceivable. To identify myself as a spatial individual among others is to
identify myself as having a range of properties. The same holds for other
spatio-temporal objects I identify. Evans is pointing out a complex of ca-
pacities that must involve identification of properties insofar as it is identi-
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fication of objects. Objects and properties do not come apart in our identifi-
cations of objects and of ourselves – or it wouldn’t be objects that we iden-
tify, ourselves among others, in a mutually constitutive package. The mu-
tually constitutive package that Evans explores, calling it identification of
spatio-temporal objects, includes properties. There is no such package with-
out them. Perhaps this entailment has been overlooked.
What distinguishes perception of properties from perception of objects,
on Evans’ outlook, is that perceiving a property includes grasping that other
instances might be tied to other objects, whereas perceiving an object in-
cludes grasping that this particular might have other properties. This is the
repeatability of properties. It shows up in the recent dictum among theorists
of mind that insofar as I can identify a property, I can also re-identify it.
More precisely, grasping repeatability requires being able to identify the
same determinate property if it recurs or recognizing similar instances. Does
perceptual engagement satisfy this condition? That is, does my account of
perception as perceptual engagement have the resources to satisfy this re-
quirement? When we focus on repeatability and hence the potential for re-
identification, we come across a problem for understanding perception that is
not just posed by one’s outlook so that on a different outlook it does not
seem problematic at all.16 It is a challenge for all concerned.
4 Engagement and Re-Identification: What Makes
Perceptual Engagement Conceptual if Not Persistence?
A genuine problem that requires that we all – conceptualists and nonconcep-
tualists alike – fine-tune our understanding of conceptual capacities is the
so-called re-identification problem. The problem is that it is possible to
raise cases where it seems that a subject can identify something that she is
later unable to re-identify. The cases are of two sorts. First, there are cases
where a subject can make certain pair-wise discriminations – and in that
sense, identify each member – yet fail to re-identify either member taken
singly. Secondly, there are cases where a subject will fail to re-identify one
item across many trials on a better than chance basis. These sorts of cases
are taken to show that our discriminatory capacity outruns our capacity to
re-identify. Insofar as it is a hallmark of conceptual capacities that concep-
tual identification entails re-identification, such cases are taken to show that
                                                
16 Yes, I am suggesting that many of the problem cases raised by nonconceptualists --
such as illusions, belief encapsulation and geometrical shapes like diamonds – can be ex-
plained quite readily from a conceptualist perspective. I regret that space does not permit
offering a conceptualist account of each of these sorts of cases here.
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we can perceive more than we can identify conceptually (in a way that sup-
ports re-identification). Some of our perception at least, it is claimed, is a
nonconceptual discriminatory capacity that “outruns” our conceptual capaci-
ties.
What is at issue is a coupling of the idea of conceptual thought and the
capacity for re-identification. There might be different motivations for be-
lieving that conceptual thought involves the capacity to identify its objects
or properties and that this must involve the capacity to re-identify those
objects or properties. But there seems to be agreement on the condition it-
self. Here are Diana Raffman’s unequivocal statements from her influential
paper, “On the Persistence of Phenomenology”: “if we can identify some-
thing whenever we encounter it, then ipso facto we can re-identify it” (p.
301), “you can recognize only what you can remember” (p.295). To some,
these points seem almost truistic. They are, in any case, common ground
between conceptualists and many nonconceptualists.
The same thought is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s investigations of the
possibility of keeping a private diary. After all, keeping a diary or keeping
track of something is identifying it and re-identifying it. Since this a locus
classicus for the re-identification condition, let’s consider it briefly. Witt-
genstein’s discussion highlights that there are circumstances in which I can-
not make the distinction between it seeming to me that I am keeping track
correctly and keeping track correctly: “whatever is going to seem right to me
is right.” If I cannot make this distinction, “that only means that here we
cannot talk about ‘right’.” (1953, §258) The core idea is that in order to
identify something, I must be able to make the distinction that the private
diarist cannot. I fail insofar as “whatever is going to seem right to me [or to
the diarist] is right.” (§258) This insight has quite a few consequences. For
example, it leads us to consider other kinds of circumstances and cases where
someone might not be in a position to make the distinction between it
seeming to her that she is identifying correctly and identifying correctly.
One such case that Wittgenstein raises is thought or identification in-
volving a sample. Here one might ask, is sheer possession of the sample –
isolating possession from any other factors that might be relevant, such as
context, etc. – sufficient for identifying (and hence re-identifying) the sam-
ple? The private diarist case indicates one condition that we need to consider.
Does sheer possession of a sample allow one to make the distinction that
the private diarist cannot? Let’s say I have a certain sample today and then I
have the same sample again tomorrow. Is that sufficient for me to have re-
sources for making a distinction between it seeming to me that I am keep-
ing track correctly and keeping track correctly? No, whatever is going to
seem right to me is right. In considering the private diarist, Wittgenstein
suggests that the problem is that the diarist lacks independent criteria of
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correctness (to which she is responsive). This lack also characterizes cases of
sheer possession of a sample.
Wittgenstein’s interweaving discussions of different kinds of thoughts
alerts us to the fact that different kinds of thoughts involve identification –
for example, thoughts that involve a sample as well as thoughts that do not
– so that we need to be alert to differences in the way various kinds of
thoughts or identifications might satisfy the need for independent criteria of
identity. His investigations also lead us to consider how the world might
help us out, different aspects of the world helping out more or less in differ-
ent sorts of cases to provide independent criteria of correctness to which we
can be responsive.
Demonstrative thought and – if I am on the right track, perceptual en-
gagement – are examples of kinds of thoughts that involve samples. If sheer
possession of a sample will not suffice for re-identification, what more is
required?
When we turn to contemporary debates about demonstrative concepts,
perception, and re-identification, we find imagery of distance and persistence.
The first image suggests that conceptual thought is characterized by a neces-
sary distance between us and what we identify. This was Evans’ idea as well:
the recombinatory nature of conceptual capacities allows for an alternative to
the sort of tight coupling between complex animals and habitats. We might
image this as a distancing that gives us some independence from our envi-
ronments, allowing our thoughts to range over more than is present to us.
Wittgenstein’s locus classicus concerning the relationship between identifi-
cation and re-identification adds another way to think about what is at issue
in the distance metaphor. What some measure of ‘distance’ (or uncoupling)
secures against is that “whatever will seem to me to be right, will be right.”
Distance is required in the sense that it allows for a distinction between it
seeming to me that I am identifying correctly and identifying correctly.
Imagery of persistence seems to be making the same suggestion as well.
Being able to keep a sample in mind so that it persists when it is not pre-
sent also ‘de-couples’ our thoughts from their context, extending their range,
thereby freeing us from our contexts and empowering us, in contrast to the
coupling of animals and their contexts.
But it should be clear that my approach goes against the persistence im-
agery. Approaching perception as perceptual engagement entails that percep-
tual content does not persist. If perceptual richness is correctly understood as
engagement with determinate properties and individuals (under perceptual
modes of presentation, of course), then such perceptual content does not
persist. I have argued that we do not retain determinate detail. I have also
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argued that there is good reason for this phenomenological datum. Insofar as
perception is perceptual engagement, when we are no longer engaged with a
determinate instance of a property, we cannot represent it with matching
determinacy because the determinacy is the determinacy of the sample – un-
der our perceptual modes of presentation to be sure.
Noting that perceptual engagement fails the ‘persistence condition’
seems to make our question more pressing: if perception is perceptual en-
gagement, does it satisfy the conditions for conceptual thought and what
sort of re-identification does it allow? This is the question that came up at
the end of examining Evans’ work, now filled-out by considerations from a
different avenue of argumentation. I suggest that the problem cases raised by
nonconceptualists lead us towards the answer, though not the nonconceptu-
alist answer.
Nonconceptualists ask us to examine situations where we can make a
pairwise discrimination but where we cannot reliably or consistently re-
identify either of the stimuli taken singly. The cases can be actual empirical
experiments or thought experiments. The experimental scenarios might con-
cern perceptual stimuli such as color patches that we can barely discriminate
or perhaps actual individual objects or items like paint chips. Let’s start
with the richer case where items or objects are at issue. Sean Dorrance Kelly
asks us to imagine a subject distinguishing between a square and a triangle
consistently. We are to imagine that the same subject is subsequently
shown the same triangle ten times. The result of this thought experiment is
that there is no reason to suppose that the subject could identify what he is
shown as the same triangle better than chance – more than five times out of
ten. Alternatively, we are to imagine a subject who can discriminate be-
tween two colour samples of very similar colors (shades of green). When the
subject is presented ten times with one of those color chips “It is perfectly
conceivable that the subject might not be able to re-identify this shade con-
sistently.” “It’s perfectly conceivable, in other words, and there’s nothing
about the nature of perception to keep it from being true, that our capacity
to discriminate colors exceeds our capacity to re-identify the colors discrimi-
nated” (Kelly, 2001, p. 411).
I do not contest that I can imagine what I am being asked to imagine.
Rather, the problem is that I can imagine too much else along these lines.
And this helps us identify what is amiss. These sorts of cases generalize in a
way that extends the nonconceptualist conclusion to absurdity, making us
think about what is going wrong in such cases.
A year ago I was so struck by the beauty of a square pottery plate that I
succumbed to the temptation to buy an extra one for myself, in addition to
buying a barely discriminable one as a wedding present. The square of pot-
tery is glazed in a deep yet vivid shade of red with a single curving blaze of
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mid blue off to one side. I could barely discriminate among the stack of such
platters, but enough at any rate to pick one for myself and one for my friend
– with the help of the patient shop owner who obligingly held up pairs for
me to choose between. Since that day this square field of vibrant red with a
blue slash sits on a bookcase in my dining room and I walk past it several
times every day. We are in the domain of a thousand or more such encoun-
ters by now. There is no doubt that I re-identify the platter correctly several
times a day. Yet I can also imagine that I would fail the re-identification test
as it is presented in discussions such as the one I cited above. Actually, I am
quite sure that I would fail. Present me ten (or more times) with the same
platter and only that platter outside of any context and I would not re-
identify it better than chance. I couldn’t be sure whether I was seeing the
same platter and I would take one stab after another at identifying it.
Once these sorts of discrimination cases set me thinking about my
square of red pottery, I couldn’t help but think about the intricately patterned
multi-color Persian carpet in my living room next door. While the pottery
square is stunning in its simplicity, the adjacent carpet is striking in its
intricacy. Spanning ten years, my encounters with the carpet are well into
many thousands. Yet if I was presented with it, just by itself over and over
again, could I consistently re-identify it? I do not think so. And this holds
true for all the individual objects in my house.
What is going wrong here? Do these cases suggest that all perceptual
content – of all individuals as well as properties – is nonconceptual in the
sense that it fails the “re-identification condition”? Some might hold this
position, but most nonconceptual content theorists would not for very good
reasons (that one might mischievously dub epistemic). If it does not make
good theoretical sense to suggest that all perceptual identification of objects
is nonconceptual and fails the re-identification condition, what has gone
wrong? And what can we learn from it?
When I consider any individual object with which I am intimately ac-
quainted, I find that I could not consistently re-identify it in the sort of sce-
nario that the discrimination trials use. The reason is that in the imagined
kind of scenario, it is not possible for me to make a distinction between it
seeming to me that I am identifying (or re-identifying) the platter correctly
and re-identifying it correctly. I cannot make that distinction all by myself
in a completely decontextualized scenario.
What the discrimination thought experiments and actual experiments
show, in part, is that identification is not a decontextualized isolatable ca-
pacity. That is not how identification works. Should this come as a sur-
prise? What if we think about Evans’ work on the capacities involved in the
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identification of spatial particulars? What he points to is a “complex” of
capacities that includes an understanding of the sort of object at issue, which
is, at the very least an understanding of it as an occupant (that might have a
variety of properties) in space in relation both to myself and to other ob-
jects. I can identify my red platter consistently because walking through my
dining room I have access to a lot of facts about it that help me out – such
as that we are both in my dining room. If you decontextualize both me and
the object, so that I have no understanding I can draw on to help identify the
object, then even if it is a beloved object with which I have often been en-
gaged, there is no reason to suppose that I can identify it better than chance.
What, in such a condition, can allow me to answer the following question:
Is this the platter I was just shown or another one barely distinguishable
from it? There is no answer I can give to this question. But if you put the
platter on my bookshelf, the worldly facts with which I engage can help me
out. That is, I can use them to help myself given all the understanding that I
can marshal.
I am suggesting that the discrimination scenarios would apply to all the
ordinary spatio-temporal individual objects with which we engage perceptu-
ally – except the faces of human beings. There is much that we do not un-
derstand yet about facial recognition, but one of the facts that we know and
that make it striking is that facial recognition survives decontextualized dis-
crimination tests. We can recognize human faces out of context – that is, we
can recognize them in very different and novel contexts where the sort of
contextual understanding that we have is just as inapplicable or unhelpful as
the no-context conditions that characterize discrimination trials. Faces are a
fascinating limiting or exceptional case to identification of spatial particu-
lars.
If this line of reasoning is correct, it indicates that discrimination trials
do teach us something, but not what the nonconceptualist suggests. Such
cases do not teach us that some identification, specifically identification of
certain properties, is nonconceptual. This is because the cases extend far
beyond the sorts of contents at which a nonconceptualist is aiming. Since
such cases extend to all identification of spatial individuals – except human
faces – this would render all perceptual identification nonconceptual. Rather
these cases indicate just how rich conceptual identification is. Take away the
context and the understanding that is integral to identification of spatio-
temporal particulars, identification fails.
Since I am using my own experiences throughout this paper – contrary
to the nonconceptualist charge that conceptualists are not motivated by the
nature of perceptual experience and that “there does not seem to be any ob-
vious phenomenological reason to hold such a [conceptualist] view,” (Kelly,
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2001, p.401)17  – let me continue in what is not mere indulgence, to indi-
cate how my exercises in phenomenology come together with my broader
philosophical training. Once I started examining my own perceptual experi-
ences of individual objects and their properties in light of the discrimination
trials, I couldn’t help but think of Wittgenstein’s private diarist passage.
The two scenarios – bare discrimination tests and private diary keeping –
have something in common, after all. To be sure, a private diarist and a
subject in a discrimination trial differ in that the former is trying to keep
track of one of his own mental episodes whereas the latter is trying to keep
track of a spatial object. Yet, the scenarios are similar in that they are both
completely de-contextualized. Neither the diarist nor the discriminating sub-
ject has a context for their exercise, a context on which they might draw.
The private diarist has no help from the world and neither does the discrimi-
nating subject (and the world includes persons, constitutively members of
communities, but there is no need in this paper to belabor what the world
is). Let me repeat – the private diarist has no help from the world and nei-
ther does the subject in discrimination trials. I am tempted to say that this
similarity is important. Without intending to do so, framers of such ex-
periments (whether they be real experiments or thought experiments) reduce
the conditions of normal perception to a decontextualized setting where it
should not be surprising that a subject cannot make a distinction between it
seeming to her that she is keeping track and keeping track. Where a subject
lacks the resources for making this distinction, we have no reason to imag-
ine performance that is better than chance. Where performance is not better
than chance, we cannot attribute understanding. On this last claim we all
agree. Perhaps these sorts of trials should make us recall not only Wittgen-
stein but also J.J. Gibson (with whose work Evans was impressed and
                                                
17 Kelly goes on to assert that philosophers motivated by phenomenology are “typically”
nonconceptualists and that conceptualists are not motivated by phenomenology. I mention this
since it is not an a-typical attitude. It strikes me as a less than un-prejudicial characterization
of the positions. “Indeed, those philosophers motivated by the phenomenology of perception
clearly reject the idea [“that perceptual content is characterized by something conceptual”].
They typically think that the content of experience is in some way richer, more complicated,
or more fine-grained than the content of thought, and therefore that perception ought not to
be characterized in terms of the elements of thought at all. McDowell and Brewer are not
motivated by the phenomenology of perception. Rather, they are motivated by a certain kind
of epistemological concern.” (pp.401-402)
Lest it seem that I am picking on Kelly’s paper in particular, allow me to clarify that my
quotations are also a compliment to the clarity of that paper.
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whose notion of information he was using).18 Recall Gibson’s point that if
we strap a subject into a chair, immobilizing all but her eyes, we cannot
expect to learn much about perception. Similarly, if we decontextualize
what the subject perceives, we cannot expect identification and we cannot
expect to learn much about lived, real world perception.
So far, I have argued that ‘sheer possession’ of a sample (for example,
in conditions that neutralize understanding, do not allow for independent
criteria of correctness, etc.) is not sufficient for understanding. What more
does perception require? I have suggested that one way to think about this is
to ask: what more is needed to enable a person to make a distinction be-
tween it seeming to her that she is identifying correctly and identifying cor-
rectly? This is the sort of ‘distance’ from one’s reactions or discriminations
(however reliable they might be) that is needed for consistent identification
that we would call conceptual. A detailed examination lies beyond the scope
of this paper. But it is important to note that such a detailed examination
would help elaborate our understanding of the capacities we call conceptual –
capacities that are recombinatory along referential and predicative dimen-
sions, that allow for re-identification, that require more than “whatever is
going to seem right to me is right.” In this paper, I have been focusing on
the importance of one’s spatio-temporal context (in the sense appropriate for
persons, namely the world). I am suggesting that when it comes to percep-
tual engagement with spatio-temporal particulars (individuals and their de-
terminate properties), the spatio-temporal context and our understanding of it
supplies what we need.
Recall my suggestion that my capacity to re-identify my red pottery
square makes use of the fact that we are both in my dining room. Evans’
work can help us understand this. Evans insists that spatial identification
involves the integration of egocentric and holistic mappings. The holistic
mapping locates the red pottery square vis-à-vis other objects in my dining
room (and locates my dining room vis-à-vis other rooms in my house, my
house vis-à-vis others on my street, my street vis-à-vis others in Toronto,
Toronto vis-à-vis other cities in Ontario, and so on.)
What if I visit my friend in Connecticut, and find myself struck by a red
pottery square in her home? My understanding that I am on a farm in Con-
necticut would enable me to identify that pottery plate as not mine but the
one I gave to her. Alternatively, I can also imagine failing to identify cor-
rectly – but only momentarily. Walking into her house I might be surprised
to see my plate on her shelf – but I would immediately correct myself.
                                                
18 Evans begins his section, “The Informational System” by giving a Gibsonian charac-
terization of the notion of information that refers the reader to Gibson’s The Senses Consid-
ered as Perceptual Systems (1968).
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Standing in her living room, after flying into LaGuardia and driving to her
farm, I could make the distinction between it seeming to me that I am iden-
tifying my red plate and identifying my red plate. I would realize immedi-
ately that this is her plate and not mine.
This is the sort of competent perceptual re-identification of individuals
and properties that we can expect. The question was: if perception is en-
gagement as I have tried to suggest, can it satisfy the conditions on concep-
tual thought? Can it satisfy re-identification – imagined not in a decontextu-
alized setting but in the sort of real-world settings that do not neutralize all
understanding? Yes, it can.
What perceptual engagement does not do is to allow ‘persistence’ in the
sense that I can continue to enjoy content of the same determinacy once I
am no longer engaged with the individual or property. But the fact that it
does not allow for the imagery of persistence does not render it non concep-
tual. Not all conceptual contents are the same. That is part of the point of
detailing interesting varieties of conceptual contents. Perceptual contents
satisfy the hallmark conditions on conceptual contents. They do not satisfy
the idea that conceptual contents persist. They had better not or we would be
disengaged from the world.
Our sense of just how wonderful perception is and our concern to under-
stand our place in the world – our theory of mind, of world, of language and
our epistemic concerns – can come together seamlessly when we allow our-
selves to notice that we are perceptually engaged with the world.
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